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Abstract
National defined contribution pension systems have long been a mainstay of retirement income
in Asia. One of the oldest and best known of these systems is the Singaporean Central
Provident Fund, a mandatory retirement scheme managed by the central government for
almost a half-century. With required contribution rates that have ranged up to 50%, this
program has powerfully shaped asset accumulation patterns and housing portfolios. This paper
explores how the structure and design of the Singaporean retirement and housing schemes
influence wealth levels and asset mix at retirement. Our model indicates that outcomes rest
critically on the interlinked national retirement and housing programs. We show that policies
to enhance one program may boost retirement replacement rates but can also lower total
wealth in unexpected ways. The lessons we draw may serve as guidance for other countries
constructing a national defined contribution retirement system.
National mandatory defined contribution pension schemes have become popular
vehicles for retirement saving in many Western nations of late, including in Australia,
Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, among others. This trend suggests that the national
retirement system of Singapore is of particular interest, in that its Central Provident
Fund (CPF) was established almost a half-century ago and is seen as the most
prominent example of what a serious and long-term national commitment to defined
contribution pensions can engender. In this paper, we explore how key design features
* Mitchell is International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans Professor of Insurance and Risk
Management, and Executive Director of the Pension Research Council, at the Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania. McCarthy is a research fellow at the Institute of Ageing at Oxford
University. Piggott is Professor of Economics, and Director of the Centre for Pensions and
Superannuation, University of New South Wales. The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support
for this research provided by the Wharton-SMU Research Center at Singapore Management University,
the Pension Research Council of the University of Pennsylvania, and the Australian Research Council.
Without implicating them we acknowledge helpful comments and suggestions from Mukul Asher,
Renbao Chen, Joseph Gyuorko, Marja Hoek-Smit, Chris Mayer, Phang Sock Yong, David Richardson,
Todd Sinai, Thomas Snyder, Keith Swailes and Augustine Tan. Opinions and conclusions are solely
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of the CPF scheme interact with the national housing policy to shape workers’ saving
and asset accumulation patterns. We also assess how well future retirees under the
system may be protected against retirement insecurity and instability in housing
returns. We show that in powerfully shaping saving and investment patterns, this
system has the potential to render citizens ‘asset rich but cash poor’ in retirement.
Better management of retirement risk may require system-wide changes to help the
nation respond to the economic challenges of rapid population aging.
The outline of the paper is as follows. First we outline the structure of Singapore’s
retirement system, focusing on the links between the national mandatory provident
fund structure and other types of asset accumulation in the nation. Next, we
scrutinize the interaction between the retirement system and housing investment
decisions, exploring in particular how government policy interlinks asset ac-
cumulation paths. Subsequently we devise a model that helps us assess how the
retirement and housing system might evolve going forward under a set of ‘baseline’
rules, and we also characterize retirees’ expected asset levels and the anticipated mix
of assets under baseline rules. A range of alternative cases is also explored. Last we
evaluate the adequacy and liquidity of retirement assets anticipated as the
Singaporean population ages. The paper closes with a discussion of policy options.
1 The Singaporean National Provident Fund
Singapore’s strategic location, strong economy, and educated population makes it
one of the more robust economies in Asia (Harris, 1996). In 1999 annual earnings
averaged S$33,600, or about US$17,000 (US$1S$2). With the exception of the
period following the Asian financial crisis, this nation’s economic performance has
been quite solid partly as a result of high levels of educational attainment: one-third
of the population now has at least some post-secondary education (Statistics
Singapore, 2000). Despite this strong economic performance in the past, its future
growth is less certain, due partly to the looming challenge of a rapidly aging
population. Singapore has one of the world’s lowest fertility rates ( 12 per 1,000)
and longest life expectancies (over age 80 at birth; Clark, 1999 and US Census
Bureau, 2000). Consequently Singapore will soon be one of the most elderly countries
in East Asia, as measured by the proportion of the population aged 65 and over (see
Table 1). In fact, in just 25 years, Singapore’s elderly contingent will be second only
to Japan’s, making it an older nation than many of its Asian neighbors and the US.
The economic challenges posed by such rapid population ageing in Singapore will
be compounded by low labor force participation rates (LFPR) among those aged 55
and over. Men’s LFPRs in Singapore fall after age 55 and are very low compared to
other nations in the region after that age. Among women, labor force attachment
rates are much lower than those of Singaporean men and at older ages are lower than
women’s employment rates in Western nations. In other words, early retirement has
apparently become the norm in Singapore, raising an important concern about the
economy’s future growth potential.
 The Singapore fertility rate in 2000 was reported as 12 by the US Census Bureau. Singaporean sources
(Singapore Department of Statistics, 2000) place it a little higher, at around 15, but declining.
 See Singapore Ministry of Manpower (2000) for a discussion of labor force participation in Singapore.
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China 660 1330 102
Indonesia 40 86 115
Japan 160 268 75
Korea 64 165 158
Malaysia 39 78 100
Singapore 68 200 194
Taiwan 82 179 118
Thailand 60 141 135
United States 127 185 46
Source : Derived from Clark (1999).
These trends raise questions about how the elderly in Singapore may fare in
retirement over the next quarter-century, and also about the kinds of policy options
available to enhance retirement security. Singapore’s old-age retirement system is
currently a mixed one, with family relations playing a dominant role in elderly
support, while government and private pensions have taken a smaller role. But the
traditional reliance on family is declining over time, with fewer older persons having
children on whom they can rely in old age – and this pattern will be exacerbated in
the years to come unless fertility, or immigration policy, is dramatically altered.
The institution on which many citizens expect to rely in the future is the
government-mandated Central Provident Fund (CPF) system. This program was
established in 1955 as a means of forced retirement savings ; over time the purpose
of the institution has evolved, and today it not only shapes retirement saving but also
offers life and health insurance, extensive home-purchase support, and educational
accounts (CPF, 2000a). Currently the system controls more than S$85 B (60% of
GDP) and covers some 25 million wage and salary employees as well as self-
employed persons earning over a minimum level (Asher, 1999b).
In order to better understand the rather complex workings of the CPF system, it
is necessary to explore the key linkages between the Provident Fund and the
Singaporean housing sector. In the subsequent section we develop a simulation model
to evaluate the likely retirement accumulation, housing wealth and asset adequacy
patterns of hypothetical workers in the Singaporean national system.
1.1 Central Provident Fund rules5
To build a forecasting framework we require appropriate actuarial and economic
adjustments for earnings, housing, asset returns, and discount rates as well as
mortality rates pertinent to Singapore. The Singaporean Provident Fund levies
 Low and Aw (1997) trace the historical roots of the Singaporean CPF.
 In the summer of 2002, several reforms in the structure of the CPF were proposed by the Economic
Review Committee of Singapore (www.erc.gov.sg), including changes to contribution rates, investment
rules, and disbursement options. However, when and how many of these proposed changes will be
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contributions on employees’ regular monthly earnings up to an earnings ceiling of
approximately $6,000month, which has not changed in nominal terms since 1984.
The CPF tax is also levied on bonuses worth up to 40% of regular income (and the
$6,000 earnings ceiling does not apply to the bonuses). Accordingly our ‘base case’
scenario represents that of a married employee whose pay is in the middle of the
Singaporean employees’ earnings distribution, around S$2,820 per month in the year
2000. Consistent with national practice, this employee is also assumed to receive two
months’ bonus salary per year (see the Appendix for more details on model
construction and data sources). We have chosen not to model bequests from elderly
relatives, as these are likely to be small for the current cohort of Singaporeans.
Real earnings are assumed to grow at 2% per annum, on top of which inflation is
assumed to be 25% annually.	 Earnings growth information is essential since
pension contributions depend on pay levels and the worker’s age, as elaborated in
Table 2. In our base case model we assume that CPF total contributions are 40% of
pay before age 55 and lower thereafter (17% for 55–60, 10% for 60–65, and 75%
after that).
 Monthly contributions are capped at a salary ceiling of S$6,000 per
worker, a level that we assume is constant in real terms (in the base case; we adapt
this in sensitivity analysis).
Consistent with the law, CPF contributions are allocated to three accounts within
the Fund: the Medisave, the Ordinary, and the Special Accounts. Medisave monies
can be spent on medical care expenses and catastrophic illness insurance. The
Ordinary Account may be devoted to finance home purchases, insurance premiums,
education expenses, and ‘approved’ investments including stock purchase on the
Singapore stock exchange. The Special Account must be saved for old-age purposes,
but may also be invested in ‘approved’ assets. Just as total contributions vary with
age, so does the breakdown of the allocations across funds.
In the ‘steady state ’ a young worker would have 6% of his total contribution
dedicated to the Medisave Account, 30% of his total to the Ordinary Account, and
implemented is unclear, so here we analyze the CPF system as it stood in mid-2002; the impact of any
reforms will be the subject of future work.
 Employer and employee contribution rates were higher in the past, reaching a total 50% between 1984
and 1986, but were reduced to 40% and then 35%, the latter in response to the Asian financial crisis
(Swailes 2000). The government has indicated in interest in returning to the 40% long-term combined
rate in the future.
 The proportion of workers contributing to the CPF who earned less than S$30,000 per year (excluding
bonuses) in 1999 was approximately 62%. However, as there are significant differences between the
earnings of males and females (average wages of $39,000 per year for males in 1999 for males and $28,000
per year for females in 1999), our salary assumption is probably a reasonable estimate for median male
earnings in 2000. These figures are from Ministry of Manpower (2000). We do not model the income tax
treatment of earnings since fewer than 30% of Singaporeans pay income tax and for them the top
marginal rate is 28%.
 The taxation of all but the largest bequests is extremely low in Singapore. There are hence no significant
incentive effects that need to be considered, with the possible exception of the very large tax exemption
on residential housing in estates ($9 million, up to any number of properties), which may further
encourage wealthy individuals to invest in housing.
	 Chen and Ann (1998), Lian, Valdez and Low (2000) and Swailes (2000) also develop simulation models
for participants in the CPF over time. We discuss these in more depth in Section 3 below.

 In model extensions we also drop the CPF rate to 30%.
 In 2000, the government capped CPF contribution rates for prime age workers at 32% as an anti-cyclical
device, but it intends to return to initial (pre-Asian crisis) contribution levels as soon as practicable. As
of 1992, all self-employed persons are also meant to be included in the scheme (CPF Board, 2000a).
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Table 2. Combined employeremployee contribution rates to the Singapore Central
Proident Fund by age and plan account (%)
Age
(from)
Long-term target 1999 rates
Ordinary Special Medisave Total Ordinary Special Medisave Total
22 300 40 60 400 24 20 60 320
35 290 40 70 400 23 20 70 320
45 280 40 80 400 22 20 80 320
55 120 00 80 200 9 00 80 170
60 70 00 80 150 2 00 80 100
65 20 00 80 100 0 00 75 75
Note : In 1999–2000 total contribution rates were lowered in response to the Asian financial
crisis and its impact on the domestic economy. These are slated to return to the long term
goal in the near term.
Source : CPF Board (2000).
4% to the Special Account. The 55-year old worker, by contrast, would by law make
only a 20% total contribution, divided as 8%, 12%, and 0% across the three
separate funds.
Investment choices are constrained in the CPF, unlike in the more flexible defined
contribution models now popular in the Western hemisphere. Thus as a Singaporean
worker accumulates an asset position in his CPF account, his funds are initially
invested by the CPF Board and are credited government-set rates of return that can
vary over time. Of late, the CPF Board has paid a minimum (nominal) interest rate
of 25% on Ordinary and Medisave Accounts, and an additional 15% on the Special
Account. These rates are described by the government as ‘market-related’ averages
of the 12-month deposit and saving rates of the four key local banks. Of course if
inflation were to exceed 25%, resulting interest rates would move close to zero (or
could be negative; Asher, 1999b).
The participant may also choose to invest his Ordinary Fund and Special Fund
assets in one of several ‘approved’ banks which then allow a worker to allocate his
excess assets across a portfolio that includes government bonds, Singaporean
equities, corporate bonds, mutual funds, and gold as well as time deposits (CPF,
2000b).
 Allocations to the Special Account are currently lower due to the Asian crisis but are likely to return to
previous rates in the next few years.
 Asher (1999) notes that this rate is set as a weighted average of the 12-month deposit rate (80%) and
last-month savings deposit rate (20%) subject to a minimum 25% nominal return, revised quarterly. He
also argues that actual CPF returns probably returned 5% on average, on an internationally invested
asset pool of about S$60B over the last decade, though no firm data are provided on the investment mix
and returns of the CPF portfolio.
 It would appear that no direct foreign investments may be held in this account, but people may purchase
individual shares and participate in initial public offerings (IPO’s). Until August 2000, the individual was
required to accumulate a minimum balance of S$65,000 in the Ordinary Account before any surplus
could be invested in the Central Provident Fund Investment Scheme (CPFIS). In addition, prior to
August 2000, only the Ordinary Account could be invested in this way; after this date both the Ordinary
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1.2 Access to CPF assets during the accumulation phase
A worker accumulating assets in the CPF cannot elect how much to contribute to the
fund, but he does face the decision of whether he should leave his assets in the CPF
as he moves through time, or whether he should use his accumulation for other
purposes. Most importantly, he is permitted to dip into his accumulating Ordinary
Account CPF funds to buy a home even before he has attained the Minimum Sum.
Hence the CPF permits participants to access a portion of the funds prior to age 55.
Table 3 contains a summary of many of the key features of the CPF.
In Singapore CPF savings have long been tied to housing investment, beginning in
1968 under Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew who introduced the Home Ownership
Scheme (HOS). The thrust of this program was to permit workers to use their CPF
accumulations to purchase public housing built under the auspices of the Housing
Development Board, which is the government authority controlling most of the
island’s housing stock. Under this format, HDB ‘standardized’ flats were constructed
in the thousands by government-operated firms and sold at highly subsidized rates to
workers whose ownership rights would extend 99 years. The HOS plan was
encouraged on the grounds that home ownership generated positive externalities,
public spiritedness, a sense of belonging, and ‘good social behavior ’ (Low and Aw,
1997: 45). Today 81% of the population owns an HDB flat, and over 95% of the
adult population are homeowners (HDB, 2000).
The particular mechanism by which a CPF account may be turned into housing is
essential to understand in order to clarify the links between retirement accumulation
and housing. In Singapore, an eligible worker may use up to 100% of his Ordinary
Account CPF savings as a down payment for his house or flat. In addition, up to his
entire monthly CPF Ordinary Account contributions may be used to service his
mortgage payment (CPF Board, 1999). The mortgage loan rate is explicitly set by
the government to be 01% above the floating nominal CPF Ordinary Account
interest rate, which has recently been 25%. This mortgage rate is attractive in view
of the 4% real return on housing in Singapore over the last 15 years (Singapore Dept
of Statistics, 1999). Whether such strong housing market returns continue in the
and the Special Accounts could be invested outside the CPF. Of the available CPF balances of S$90
billion, only around S$30 billion had been invested in these approved investments as of December 2000
(CPF Annual Report, 2000). Both of these figures exclude all investment of CPF funds in housing. In
addition, a January 2002 News Release on the CPF Investment Scheme (CPF Board, 2002), shows that
only 37,000 CPF members made any significant profits (S$1,000) on their investments over the CPF
interest they would have received had they not participated in the CPF Investment Scheme. For this
reason, the analysis that follows does not devote special focus on the CPF Investment Scheme.
 As long as the mortgage payments are no higher than 24% of income (HDB 2000).
 As noted above, he may also use the Ordinary Account assets to purchase mutual funds or shares, or
to invest the money in education.
 Subsequently the program was extended to include private homeownership but private development is
restricted to small portions of the island.
 Workers may not deduct interest payments on their first mortgage for CPF mortgage payments.
Technically the downpayment should be paid by the worker out of non-CPF funds, but if necessary a
bridge loan can be obtained and accumulated CPF funds can be used to repay the loan (CPF Board,
1999: 4). The eligible worker seeking to buy a flat directly from the HDB must be a resident national
over the age of 20, and have total income of under S$1,500 for a three-room flat or and $8,000 for a four-
and five-room flat (HDB, 2000). Resale flats may be purchased on the open market with CPF funding
if the buyer earns under S$8,000 per month and has no other active HDB subsidy.
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Table 5. Housing accumulation and decumulation patterns in Singapore by age and
dwelling size
By age
Per cent of 1990 housing stock
Upgrading Downgrading





By dwelling type Per cent of 1990 housing stock
Initial dwelling type Upgrading Downgrading
HDB Flats
1 & 2 Rm 270 00
3 Rm 180 26
4 Rm 110 68
5 Rm 110 112
Exec6 Rm 100 114
Private housing 00 216
Source : Derived from Department of Statistics (1997: 4 & 6).
future (Ong, 2000) is less certain, particularly in view of the fact that property indexes
have fallen over 20% in the year 2000 and declining fertility rates may undermine
future housing demand. (We examine sensitivity to these future appreciation rates in
our simulation analysis, below.)
Not only does the HDB offer low-interest loans for home acquisition; it also
provides eligible buyers with a large subsidy toward their purchase price. This is
evident from the long waiting lists for HDB flats (recently as high as three to five years
in duration; lately these have been much shorter), and it underscores the substantial
difference between the market price of an HDB flat and the worker’s subsidized
purchase price. Another subsidy is granted if a household purchases its flat on the
open market instead of directly from the HDB, worth S$30,000.	 These up-front
purchase subsidies come with a later repayment consequence, in that the HDB then
has a claim on a resale levy worth 225% of the home sale value when applied to a
four-room flat (or 25% to a five-room or ‘executive ’ apartment). Excess cash is
earmarked to repaying the worker’s CPF account with interest, though the worker
may use it to ‘upgrade’ his housing stock by buying a new, larger, flat. Upgrading is
accomplished by using the CPF accruals, as well as another HDB purchase price
subsidy that must be repaid at the time of the sale via the resale levy. This complex
of subsidies, summarized in Table 4, apparently induces substantial investment in
housing and upgrading over time, such that more than 20% of the population shifts
	 Until recently, this subsidy was only granted if the individual purchased a home near his aged parents.
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housing in any given year and twice as many upgrade as downgrade. Most housing
turnover occurs among workers under age 50; downgrading is rare for the 60 year
olds, amounting to only 3% of all movers. Table 5 contains some recent data on
housing accumulation and decumulation patterns in Singapore.
1.3 Provident Fund decumulation patterns
CPF assets must be preserved until the worker attains age 55 in Singapore, except for
the uses identified above. At age 55, a CPF member may apply to withdraw cash
worth up to half of his CPF assets in his Ordinary Account over the so-called
‘Minimum Sum’ level. This Minimum Sum has been set by the government as
approximately equal to the amount needed to purchase a subsistence-level single life
annuity.
 The rationale provided for this minimum is to ensure that the retiree has
a retirement income stream without selling his home in his elder years. A 55-year old
worker having too little cash savings in both his Ordinary and Special CPF accounts
at that point could partly meet the Minimum Sum threshold by pledging property. In
addition, a couple’s children may also top-up their parents’ accounts (and the funds
revert to the children if the parents predecease them).
At age 55, funds in the CPF up to the Minimum Sum may be transferred to an
approved life insurer to purchase an annuity that will commence at age 62. Private
insurers compete for this business, and it is not mandatory that the participant buys
a life annuity. Approximately 15% of Singaporean retirees do appear to annuitize at
least a portion of their retirement income (Doyle, Mitchell, and Piggott, 2000).
Alternatively, the funds can be left with the CPF Board to earn interest (at the Special
Account Rate, or 15% above the Ordinary Account Rate) and are then paid out from
age 62, or invested with an approved bank and then paid out at 62 (CPF, 2000c).
Any Minimum Sum benefit not annuitized can be transferred to a surviving spouse
in the event of death and counted against that survivor’s Minimum Sum requirement,
or paid out as a lump sum if the total is greater. The Minimum Sum is being phased
in gradually ; it is currently slated to rise to S$80,000 in 2003, again with S$40,000 that
may be pledged as property.
2 A model of retirement accumulation and decumulation in Singapore
To evaluate this complex set of interactions between the CPF and the housing
scheme, we have devised a projection model of earnings, contributions, asset
accumulation, and housing patterns over the life cycle. The results for the base case
are presented first ; subsequently we explore other cases to evaluate the sensitivity of
results to parameters of key policy interest.

 In July 2000, the government raised the Minimum Sum from S$60,000 to $65,000, of which $40,000
could be pledged in property and the rest of which would have to be in cash (Straits Times, 2000). A lump
sum of this magnitude would generate a monthly benefit of S$498 for life. Couples are required to have
15 times this amount. This total is slated to be raised to $80,000 in annual increments.
 A few occupations may retire at 60 instead of 62.
 If there is no survivor, the remainder of the Minimum Sum would be paid as a lump sum to his
beneficiaries (CPF 2000c). If the children had topped up their parent’s account, unused assets would
revert to the childrens’ CPF accounts.
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2.1 A base case scenario
Our base case analysis relies on the structural framework of the CPF and housing
subsidies outlined above, and a set of assumptions (that are summarized in the Data
Appendix). All monetary values are given in S$2,000 terms. The analysis assumes a
starting earnings level of S$30,000 in 2000 for a male worker with a dependent spouse
of the same age, a real earnings growth rate of 2%, real housing returns of 4%, and
annual real interest rates of 0% and 15% in the Ordinary and Special Accounts,
respectively. Inflation is assumed to be 25% per annum. Housing purchase and sale
prices as well as mortgage rates and capital subsidies are as reported on the CPF and
HDB websites. Our base case further assumes that the worker buys his first flat as
soon as he has accumulated sufficient cash in the Ordinary Account for a down
payment, he spends no more than his CPF Ordinary contributions for the mortgage,
and he accumulates any extra cash in the CPF until retirement at age 62. At that point
he buys an actuarially fair real annuity with his cash accumulation ( joint and
survivor) and continues to live in his flat without downgrading. Occupational
schemes are very rare in Singapore, implying that the individual could only augment
his CPF accumulation with private savings.
The retirement annuity thus generated may be compared to two alternative
standards of retirement income adequacy. First we assess the earnings replacement
rate (EarnsRR), or the ratio of the retirement annuity payment relative to the
worker’s pre-retirement pay. While there is no single and widely agreed-on ‘gold
standard’ for the replacement rate that retirees require in old-age, Western pension
experts typically recommend a target of the order of 75% (McGill et al., 1996). This
rate is therefore the adequacy standard used in what follows. The second adequacy
target against which the CPF system can be judged is the government-decreed
Minimum Sum which retirees are required to have in their fund at retirement. This
amount has presumably been selected as a threshold below which income would be
inadequate for subsistence. Using this criterion, then, we use as the second adequacy
criterion what we term the ‘subsistence replacement rate ’ (SubsRR), which compares
the retiree’s CPF accrual at retirement with the (real) value of the Minimum Sum.
Turning to the base case results, Table 6 indicates a range of projected outcomes
for the worker at ages 50, 55, 60, and 65; we also provide results for age 62, the
national retirement age. In the first two columns the worker’s rising real earnings and
total wealth are tracked through time, with wealth topping S$1 million by age 50
including CPF and housing assets. Assets continue to grow with continued work,
amounting to S$18 million at retirement at age 62. The next panel to the right in the
Table underscores the key role played by housing assets in this system. This typical
worker would be expected to have around 75% of his retirement assets in housing
 Actuarially fair annuities are valued using Singaporean annuitant tables ; see Doyle, Mitchell and Piggott
(2000) and Fong (2002). The impact of differing annuity costs can be estimated by proportionally
reducing the income by the increase in annuity prices over actuarially fair rates.
 In the analysis reported below we assume that the retired couple needs twice the Minimum Sum to
remain at subsistence in retirement, though technically the government requires a married couple to
preserve only 15 times the Minimum Sum in the retirement system at retirement.
 This total also includes accumulation in the Medisave account though these funds are not generally
accessible for housing or consumption other than health care-related expenses.
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Figure 1. Earnings and subsistence replacement rates by age using base case assumptions
from age 50 on to retirement. This concentration of retirement wealth in housing is
much higher than in the US, for instance, where housing wealth for a median older
household amounts to only 20% of retirement wealth, including social security
entitlements (Moore and Mitchell, 2000).
Liquid assets in the worker’s Ordinary and CPF Accounts amount to a relatively
stable one-fifth of the worker’s total wealth; the dollar value of this fifth does rise over
time from to S$230,000 at age 50, to S$337,000 by age 62. Parenthetically, we note
that continued work pays off quite well, since if the individual continued to work to
age 65, his total wealth would rise by S$182,000 with roughly the same fractional
division across asset types.
Next we inquire how large a life annuity the retiree could purchase given his non-
housing assets (assuming annuitant survival tables relevant to Singapore). In the base
case, the worker is assumed to be married to a wife of the same age, so the joint and
survivor benefit purchasable from the CPF cash sum at age 62 would generate a (real)
life annuity of S$21,000 per year. This is approximately a 28% earnings replacement
rate, or only one-third of the 75% EarnsRR suggested by retirement planners.
Additional years of work to age 65 would have only a modest impact on the life
annuity, boosting it to $25,000, and would raise the replacement rate to only 30%.
Turning to the second adequacy criterion, here the picture is much more positive,
with benefits for this hypothetical couple totaling almost three times subsistence at
age 62. Once again, working longer helps, with the SubsRR rising to 343% if
retirement were delayed to age 65. Figure 1 shows how these two replacement rates
change as the worker ages, his pay and contribution amounts change, each account
earns its respective rate of return, mortgage subsidies are incurred and repaid, and
homes are purchased and sold. Figure 2 indicates how the worker’s assets are
allocated over his lifespan prior to retirement, with housing comprising the lion’s
share of the account from the age when he purchases his first home.
We analyzed the impact of our initial wage assumption by running the model over
a whole range of wages, from S$11,000 to S$71,000. The earnings replacement rate
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Figure 2. Asset mix by age using base case assumptions
never rose higher than 30% – at higher wage levels, the replacement rate starts to
decline. This is because at these wage levels, the individual starts to break through the
contribution ceiling near the end of his life, and hence contributes less overall to the
CPF. Below S$30,000, earnings replacement rates rise rapidly from approximately
0% at a non-bonus income of S$11,000 p.a. to 28% at S$30,000. The wage-
replacement rate profile is shown as Figure 3. It should be noted here that the housing
purchase assumption remains unchanged, regardless of income. In other words, the
individuals earning S$11,000 and the individuals earning S$71,000 purchase the same
size house. This is admittedly unrealistic. We did, however, examine the sensitivity of
our results to the house purchase assumption, and found our essential conclusions to
be unchanged.
In sum, under reasonable assumptions our simulation model indicates that CPF
accumulations at age 62 could generate a relatively small level of liquid income if
annuitized, sufficient to cover subsistence but worth only about a quarter of pre-
retirement pay in the base-case scenario. Consequently, those households accustomed
to higher consumption levels while employed might find themselves in a serious cash
bind when retired. While the couple’s housing and probably much of their medical
care needs are in effect prefinanced by the housing stock and Medisave Accounts, this
was also true prior to retirement. Hence the drop in cash flows at retirement may
come as a shock to some.
2.2 Responses under alternative scenarios
It is useful to explore how sensitive these results are to a range of alternative scenarios,
so as to show how the findings might change given alternative policy outcomes and
 We examined the impact of three changes to the housing purchase assumption. Firstly, we allowed the
family to purchase the second house first, rather than upgrading. This lowered the ERR from 28% to
25%. We allowed the family to purchase houses that were 20% cheaper (this could be done by buying
equally sized houses in a less-desirable development), which raised the ERR to 33%. Finally we tested
the model if the family chose to stay in the first house and did not purchase the second house. In this
case the ERR increased to 36%.
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Initial Annual Earnings excl Bonus (2000 S$)
Figure 3. Earnings replacement rate at age 62 using base case assumptions but changing
initial annual earnings
economic scenarios. In this section, we report on the impact of four possible changes
in the structure of the CPF rules, and five potential changes in the framework shaping
housing policy. The hypothetical CPF changes we examine include:
 boosting the CPF return from 015% real to 5% real on both accounts ;
 increasing the flow of contributions to the Special Account from 4 to 8%,
holding the total contribution rate fixed;
 holding the CPF contribution ceiling at its current nominal level instead of
holding it constant in real terms;
 lowering CPF contribution rates in perpetuity from 40% to 30%.
The hypothetical housing framework changes we model include:
 reducing the assumed real return on housing from 4% to 0%;
 maintaining assumed real housing returns at 4% for 10 years, then 0%
thereafter ;
 experiencing real housing returns 0% for 10 years, and 4% thereafter ;
 decreasing the HDB capital levy from 225%25% to 0%;
 doubling the HDB capital subsidy in real terms.
We note in passing that these policy experiments are not intended as recommendations
regarding changes that should be implemented singly or in concert. Also the
simulations are not behavioral, in that they assume that employees do not offset plan
changes by altering private saving or retirement patterns. Such an extension remains
for future research. Rather, our goal is to assess each scenario separately to evaluate
how they influence the retiree’s asset accumulation, the asset composition, and the
adequacy standards of particular interest in the present context.
Results of the sensitivity analysis are provided in Table 7 where for ease of
reference we replicate the base case results at age 62 in Line 1. Next we report the
impact of the four CPF changes. The first two are anticipated to increase the retiree’s
cash flow position, since they increase the size of the Special CPF account, either
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directly or via an increase in the rate of return. Boosting CPF returns (Line 2) has the
larger impact, raising total wealth to over S$2 million and hiking the earnings
replacement rate to 34%. This is in line with Asher’s (1998) and Swailes’ (2000) view
that improving the CPF’s investment performance would be a relatively beneficial
and possibly low-cost effort. It is interesting that doubling contributions to the
Special Account (out of a fixed total, Line 3) enhances retiree liquidity but only
relatively modestly. In other words boosting CPF returns may have a larger impact
than reallocating the amount going to different accounts within the system.
The impact of cutting the size of the CPF program is represented in Lines 4 and
5, accomplished by either holding contribution ceilings fixed in nominal terms, or by
limiting total contributions to 30% of payroll for the entire worklife (both policies
have been discussed in Singapore policy circles of late ; Swailes, 2000). Either of these
two policies produces about a 10% cut in total retirement wealth but a much larger
40–50% drop in the earnings replacement rate (Column C). The reason for this
change is that housing accumulations continue at about the same rate due to the
relatively attractive rate of return with this asset, so the contribution cut plays out in
the form of less liquidity at retirement. Both policies also generate retirement cash
flows now only 15 to 19 times the subsistence replacement rate (Column D), leaving
retirees far more vulnerable to inadequate income in old age.
We turn next to the policy experiments involving changes in the housing market
and associated policies, and these analyses strongly emphasize the central role that
housing policy plays in Singapore’s retirement system. For example, if the real rate
of return on housing were to fall from 4% to 0% and remain at this new level, this
would almost cut in half total wealth accumulation over the lifetime (Column A, Line
6). Though such a drastic shock to the growth rate of housing would seem extreme
in the light of long-term patterns, the chance that it could occur is underscored by
Japan’s recent experience with real estate values remaining depressed for the last
decade. It is worth noting that under this experiment earnings and subsistence
replacement rates are virtually constant or even rise somewhat, because the worker
would be required to wait longer to upgrade his housing and hence would hold more
in cash in his CPF account. Earnings and subsistence rates are also fairly stable if the
housing return regime changes, as in Line 7 when the rate falls through time or Line
8 where it rises through time. While the retiree’s total wealth on Line 7 is less than
half that of Line 8, his cash income from the CPF account is more or less invariant
across these scenarios.
The last two lines involve changing the extent to which the Housing Development
Board increases or decreases the lifetime subsidy to housing purchase. Predictably,
lowering the capital levy at resale increases total wealth by 30%, while boosting the
subsidy enhances lifetime wealth by 15% (Column A). But more surprising is the fact
that these two policies have quite disparate impacts on replacement rates : the first
policy increases replacement rates by 21% while the second increases them by 75%
(Column C)! The reason has to do with timing: housing purchase subsidies are
generally granted to workers when they are young, increasing their ability to get into
the housing market early and exposing them to the much higher housing market
returns for a longer period of time. By contrast, the capital levy is imposed later in
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life when a dwelling is sold, a timing pattern that leaves a shorter period over which
the impact can be felt.
The last column of Table 7 summarizes the effect of each of these policy
experiments in a somewhat different way, by converting them into a real internal rate
of return (IRR) on property holdings. This represents the internal rate of return that
sets equal to zero the worker’s lifetime expenditures minus sales of housing, net of
purchase subsidies and capital levies, and after subtracting mortgage payments. The
IRR on housing for the base case is an appealing real 58%, higher than can be
earned on CPF contributions left in the retirement fund and also higher than the rate
of housing appreciation experienced in Singapore in the recent past. This difference
is essentially due to difference in the purchase price and mortgage subsidies over the
capital levy on housing. As a result, CPF participants would appear to be quite
rational in devoting as much of their CPF Ordinary Account asset as feasible to invest
in housing. In other words, it is no wonder that people are asset rich and relatively
cash poor under this system, since the incentives appear to favor investment in
housing and property upgrading at the earliest opportunity.
Turning to the policy experiments, it is interesting that none of the CPF-reform
scenarios generates an internal return as large as or greater than the base case scenario
annual real return of 58%. Boosting CPF returns is predicted to cut the IRR on
property because the rate charged for the HDB mortgage is assumed to be linked to
the return on the CPF accounts. All the other CPF experiments also reduce the IRR,
usually because they delay purchase of the house and hence postpone the receipt of
the substantial HDB subsidies. The changes in housing policy (lines 6–10) show that
the IRR on property sinks to well under 1% in the cases that curtail real housing
returns in the long term (not surprisingly). More unexpected is the huge boost in the
property IRR resulting from a doubling in the capital subsidy, which ends up making
the house investment pay an IRR of close to 9% real. This last policy is unique
among those examined, improving all four outcomes examined: total wealth, both
replacement rates, and IRR’s.	 Least satisfactory according to these four criteria are
policies that lower housing wealth, replacement rates, and IRR’s.
Figure 4 indicates how many of the various policy experiments fare as retirement
is delayed, tracing earnings and subsistence replacement rates with age. It is worth
nothing that most of the housing experiments produce replacement rates that are at
least equivalent to or dominate the base case. On the other hand many of these
housing policies would require additional financing. Most of the CPF reforms have
small and often negative effects, with one exception: boosting CPF returns over time.
This plan could enhance benefits and avoid additional tax financing, if CPF assets
were invested on world markets and the resulting higher returns were passed on to
plan participants.
 All wealth and IRR calculations use house sale prices net of the HDB resale levy.
 This conclusion does not adjust for differential risk patterns that might accrue to housing versus CPF
account values. However since the housing stock is controlled by the government just as is the CPF fund,
it is not obvious whether the risk characteristics of the two assets are strongly different.
	 Determining the source of financing for this capital subsidy is beyond the scope of this paper but far from
irrelevant, of course.
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Figure 4. Married earnings replacement rate under alternative scenarios. Numbers refer to
the line of each scenario in Table 7.
3 Discussion
Because the Singaporean Central Provident Fund is one of the largest and oldest
national defined contribution systems, its workings are of keen interest to would-be
pension reformers in the rest of the world. Having explored the structure and design
of the nation’s retirement system, we have been able to identify several ways in which
the design of the retirement income system shapes retirement asset levels and
portfolio mix. We find that outcomes rest critically on the interlinked relative returns
of the retirement scheme and housing assets : increases in one can boost replacement
rates but may lower total wealth in unexpected ways.
Our simulations show that average workers in Singapore are indeed likely to be
asset rich and cash poor, as long as housing values continue to rise in real terms.
However if the housing market were to take a downturn and remain depressed for
years as in Japan, this could reduce retirement asset accumulation substantially.
Retirees appear to be able to support themselves at the subsistence level, but they
perhaps could do much better if they could access some of the equity in the house.
3.1 Lessons to be gleaned
Our analysis thus far may be summarized according to these key points :
 The average worker in the base case is projected to have substantial retirement
wealth of close to S$1 million or more at age 62 (in today’s S$). Three-quarters
of this will be held in housing, and some 20% in liquid form. Annuitizing the
latter for a married couple would yield a retirement income that exceeds
subsistence targets, but one that replaces only 28% of pre-retirement earnings,
a low rate by financial planners’ standards. Hence the retirement system
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framework does seem likely to render average workers asset rich and cash poor
at retirement.

 Levels of retirement assets as well as the retirement asset mix are critically
influenced by the rules and structure of both the Central Provident Fund and the
Housing Development Board in Singapore. Boosting the CPF return or the
amount deposited in the Special Account (which cannot be used for housing) has
the effect of enhancing retiree liquidity, particularly the former policy. Cutting
CPF contributions slashes earnings replacement rates by up to half and brings
retirees much closer to the subsistence rate in old age.
 A long-term fall in real housing appreciation rates would strongly depress total
wealth accumulation and have a smaller impact on retirement cash flows.
Boosting the capital subsidy greatly enhances replacement rates since this gets
young people into the housing market earlier.
 Each of these policies can be expressed as its impact on the internal rate of return
on housing. In the base case, the worker earns an implicit IRR of 58% real on
housing, implying that CPF participants are rational to invest in housing as early
and as often as possible, especially as funds left in the CPF earn approximately
0% p.a. real. It also explains why Singaporeans might end up asset rich and
relatively cash poor at retirement.
 Under other policy regimes the IRR on housing falls, sometimes precipitously,
with one exception being one where CPF returns are enhanced substantially.
Raising the capital subsidy also boosts the IRR on housing.
3.2 Related studies
Our simulation model incorporates all the essential elements of the Singaporean
retirement and housing systems in predicting retirement accruals and asset mix. We
show that it is essential to include not only elements of how the CPF works but also
the national housing model to understand retirees’ eventual asset level and portfolio
mix positions. This point has yet to be fully recognized in scholarly writings on this
topic. In one recent study, Chen and Wong (1998) devise a projection model to
estimate retirement income adequacy under the CPF, assuming as here that a worker
saves 40% of his annual S$9,600 annual salary from age 25 to retirement at age 55.
Most critically, however, that study does not take into account the use of CPF
accruals for home purchases, so their replacement rate estimates are not comparable
with those reported here.
In an actuarial model of replacement rates, Lian et al. (2000) compute projected
retirement replacement rates after allowing for housing purchases along the way in
the Singaporean context. However that study does not take into account the complex
subsidies and taxes across different CPF accounts and housing purchases and sales as
we have explored here. Chen et al. (1997) examine the knowledge and attitudes of
Singaporeans towards the CPF. A related model by Swailes (2000) comes the closest

 Again, we note that housing and medical care needs are in large part covered by the housing stock and
Medisave accounts.
 They further assume the CPF rate of return and salary growth are 4%, they set inflation at 3%, and they
use a deterministic life expectancy at retirement rather than assessing the annuity flow produced by the
cash account.
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to the approach we take, but the analysis does not explore the impact of long-term
housing price recessions on potential retirement wellbeing. Also these prior studies
focus only on earnings replacement rates but then do not evaluate how well retirees
do is-a-is subsistence rates nor do they look at asset mix. To our knowledge, no
other international study has devoted adequate attention to the key interactions
between pension and housing policy in either the Singaporean or other national
contexts.
3.3 Useful extensions
To offer further guidance on policy reforms from an economic perspective, it would
be necessary to pose and measure adequacy, equity, and efficiency criteria by which
specific outcomes and policy reforms can be judged. Above we introduced two
adequacy criteria, namely the earnings replacement and subsistence replacement rate
thresholds, though others might be equally valid. A fuller assessment of the system
would also ask whether the program is equitable in guaranteeing minimum income to
all workers, and whether the program (and retirees) may suffer shortfall possibilities.
It would also be useful to assess system efficiency, asking for instance whether the
concentration of retirement assets in housing produces a risky portfolio that is
underdiversified. Though there are social externalities leading policymakers to
encourage home ownership, retirees end up rather vulnerable to domestic market
risk, particularly in regards to the housing market. Additional extensions could also
model potential responses by the various players (e.g. how changes in housing
subsidies could influence housing prices) ; such an exercise is beyond the scope of the
present paper.
4 The broader context
Evidently additional asset diversification in the CPF could probably improve
retirement system returns while lowering retirees’ exposure to potentially large
fluctuations in the value of their main asset, housing. This could be implemented by
permitting the CPF to invest on the world capital market, or alternatively by moving
to an individual-accounts type model where individual plan participants elect their
own asset mix. The latter could be accomplished by making the CPF pension scheme
into an employer-based 401(k) type pension plan; though occupational pensions are
rare in Singapore at present, this model has been adopted in Australia (Bateman et
al., forthcoming). Either way, liberalization of asset investment patterns might move
CPF participants closer to the international financial efficiency frontier and permit
globalization of the accumulation phase. This approach has been followed in several
countries that have recently instituted national defined contribution pension systems,
including Chile ; others, however, others have required the pension system to invest
only in government bonds as in the CPF case, most recently Mexico (Mitchell and
Barreto, 1997).
One problem in the Singapore context is that permitting pension fund
diversification could possibly depress homeowners’ housing values, a matter of
 Some studies of retirement wealth are beginning to acknowledge the key importance of housing equity
in the retirement wealth picture ; see Moore and Mitchell (2000).
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serious policy concern. This raises the more general question of how well the system
will be able to survive the demographic transition now facing Singapore along with
many of its neighbors. Since the CPF and HDB framework leans so heavily on
preserving housing values and the retirement wealth this represents, maintaining their
value will likely require encouraging large immigration flows as well as boosting
fertility, both difficult social engineering tasks.
One response might be to liberalize housing policy, permitting people to legally rent
out their flats or rooms (practices not currently permitted in Singapore). A
complementary approach would permit older persons to access some of their
substantial housing asset values, so as to preserve old-age consumption. Downgrading
one’s home is also a way to release capital at older ages, but for older people the need
to pay the capital levy can make this an expensive proposition. Alternative
approaches might use a home equity loan or reverse annuity mortgage, though
neither appear to be popular in Singapore at the moment. Other countries’
experiences suggest that it is difficult to write enforceable contracts in this area; that
is, there is a substantial political cost for evicting elderly residents from their homes
for nonpayment or lack of upkeep of the premises. US evidence also suggests
problems of adverse selection and substantial loads in the reverse mortgage market.
Other policy actions to boost housing prices might include restricting the supply of
housing to hold up prices, influencing the supply of and price of mortgages to the
same end, changing rental regulations on HDB dwellings, changing immigration
policy to attract foreign talent, or maintaining a low return on CPF investments.
However these latter policies might not reduce the chances of being asset rich but cash
poor in old age.
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Data appendix: description of model and assumptions
(See table below for item references)
(a) Annual labor earnings : Total earnings taken from the Singapore Department of
Statistics (1994). Starting level updated to 1999 using wage inflation rates for
1990–1999 to produce real (in S$ 1999) average earnings per month. Monthly average
is to S$2,818, a level that compares well with the 1999 average of S$2,813 reported
by Ministry of Manpower (2000). That report also gives the 1999 monthly rate of pay
for men as S$3,222. These levels translate into approximately 1999 S$35,000–S$38,000
p.a. ; here we model earnings of S$30,000 p.a.
(b) Labor bonus : The Singapore report on wages (Ministry of Manpower, 2000) gives
average bonus as  2 months salary for each grade of employee, an assumption used
in this simulation.
(c) Rate of real earnings growth : Real earnings growth in Singapore has averaged
approximately 5% over the 1990s (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1999). The base
case analysis assumes a 2% p.a. real growth rate. Understating real wage growth
would tend to overstate replacement rates but understate final retirement wealth.
(d) Inflation rates : Inflation rates in Singapore averaged approximately 2% p.a. over
the 1990s, and 15% p.a. over the second half of the 1990s (Singapore Department
of Statistics, 2000). Our base case models inflation at 25% p.a. on the view that this
rate is more likely in the future.
(e) CPF contribution rates : The base case assumes that CPF contribution rates stand
at the long-term stated level of 40%, split in the traditional way between Ordinary,
Special and Medisave Accounts. Short-term deviations from this level (such as the
recent reduction to 30% due to the Asian financial crisis) are not modeled in the base
case.
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Input parameters (all in 2000 S$ real terms unless indicated )
(a) Annual earnings 30,000
(b) Months of bonus 2
(c) Annual real earnings growth 200%
(d) Annual inflation 250%
(e) Ordinary CPF contribution rate 30%
Special CPF contribution rate 4%
Medisave CPF contribution rate 6%
Employer’s CPF contribution rate 20%
Use age-adjusted CPF contributions 1
(f ) Capital appreciation on housing (a) 4%
Capital appreciation on housing (b) 4%
Threshold to start using (b) (years) 10
(g) CPF rate of return (Ordinary) 000%
CPF rate of return (Special) 150%
CPF rate of return (Medical) 000%
(h) Medical costs 150
Medical cost escalation 900%
Threshold escalation 000%
(j) First house (purchase price) 155,000
(k) First house (market price) 240,000
(l) Resale levy 225%
Term of first mortgage 25
( j) Second house (purchase price) 255,000
(k) Second house (market price) 370,000
(l) Resale levy 25%
Term of second mortgage 30
(m) Nominal contribution ceiling inflation 250%
(n) Monthly subsistence income 282
(o) Real subsistence Inflation 000%
Calculated parameters
Nominal mortgage rate 260%
(f,g) Rates of return on property : Flatscondominiums in Singapore have returned
4% p.a. real since 1985 (Singapore Department of Statistics, 1999). The HDB Resale
Index gives a return of 95% p.a. real from 1990–3Q2000 (HDB website ‘Resale Price
Index of HDB Flats ’, Yearbook of Statistics 2000). The base case in the analysis uses
a real return on property of 4% p.a.
(h) CPF Interest rates : CPF Interest rates in the base case are taken from historical
values of CPF rates as quoted on the CPF website www.cpf.gov.sg. Prior to 1998 the
Special Account received 125% more than the Ordinary Account; in mid-1998, the
law was changed to pay the Special Account 15% more than the Ordinary Account.
The CPF Ordinary Account has earned approximately 0% p.a. real return,
historically, so the base case uses 0% p.a. for the Ordinary and 15% p.a. real for the
Special Accounts.
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( j,k) House purchase and sale prices : House purchase prices are taken from the HDB
website (‘Average prices of new flats offered in FY 19971998’). The base case
assumes that all housing costs are denominated in nominal S$2000. The hypothetical
worker is first assumed to buy a four-room flat and then later upgrades to a five-room
flat. Sale values are taken from the HDB website ‘Average valuation by town and flat
type’ under the section ‘Resale of HBD flats ’. Average values are approximate, but
we select those in the lower part of the range to account for the easing of house values
in the HDB market in the late 1990s.
(l) HDB Resale leies : The value of the resale levy is taken from www.hdb.gov.sg and
involves a 225% levy when applied to a four-room apartment and 25% to a five-
room and executive apartment.
(m) Minimum sum : The government-specified Minimum Sum applies only at age 55,
and seeks to ensure that at 55 people do not empty the CPF of cash, but instead leave
some in the CPF account. The base case assumes that the individual leaves all the case
in the CPF until retirement (age 62) and then purchases an annuity with the entire
proceeds. Even if the individual were to remove all hisher money from the CPF at
age 55, the same replacement rate will apply. Currently the Minimum Sum is
scheduled to rise to S$80,000 by 2003, of which half can be pledged in property and
half in cash. If one assumes that this level will remain constant in real terms, this is
one of various alternative adequacy criteria.
(n,o) Monthly subsistence income : The government standard for monthly subsistence
income is taken from CPF (2000c) for 1 July 2000–30 June 2001. We assume that this
income level is fixed in real terms over time. The subsistence level for couples is
assumed to be double that for singles in our computations (though the government
requirement for couples for the Minimum Sum is 15 times that for single persons).
Nominal mortgage rate : The nominal mortgage rate is calculated as the nominal
return on the CPF Ordinary Account plus 01%, as specified by the HDB.
Earnings replacement rates : Earnings replacement rates are calculated assuming the
retiree buys a simple life real annuity (with no adverse selection and no profitrisk
loadings). This annuity is computed on the basis of 5% p.a. nominal interest (the
statutory rate specified by the MAS) and mortality is assumed to follow the UK a (55)
annuitants table with a lag of three years.
Subsistence replacement rates : This is the proportion of the real monthly subsistence
income that the retiree is able to buy at retirement.
Spouse : The base case analysis assumes that the worker is male and married, and he
purchases a joint-and-survivor annuity which pays a level real amount until both
spouses die. We assume that the wife is the same age as the husband and that her
mortality follows the a(55) table for females, also with an age adjustment of three
years. We assume that the subsistence income for a couple is twice that of an
individual.
